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NEW YORK ABANDONS CHARITABLE
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The concept of granting an immunity from tort liability to a
charitable institution has been questioned since its adoption in the
United States. Even during the time Massachusetts was first accepting
this doctrine,' Rhode Island was rejecting it.2 This conflict continues
to this day. "From full immunity, through varied but inconsistent
qualifications to general responsibility is the gamut of decision." a
The earlier decisions, whether granting complete or only partial
immunity, based the rule of immunity on the trust fund theory.4 Vari-
ous jurisdictions, however, finding dissatisfaction with this theory,
advanced others: the implied waiver by the acceptance of benefits
theory,5 the independent contractor theory,6 and the public policy
theory.7 The rule was also subjected to various distinctions: medical
or administrative,8 stranger or beneficiary, 9 and personal injury or
'McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, 12o Mass. 432 (1876). The court
based its decision on an English case, Holliday v. St. Leonard's, Schoreditch, ii
C.B. [N.s.] 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (i86i). The court apparently failed to note that
the case had been overruled. See Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury L.R. 6 Q.B. 214,
217-18 (1871).
-Glavin v. The Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411 (1879). This case was later
partially overruled by statute. R.I. Gen. Laws, c. 177, § 38 (1896).
'President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 13o F.2d 81o, 812
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
'This theory is that the charity holds its funds in trust for a particular chari-
table purpose, and that a recovery cannot be had from these funds as it would
thwart the intent of the donor and allow the courts to divert the funds indirectly
while prohibiting the trustees from doing so directly, thus breaching the trust.
McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876); Perry v. The
House of Refuge, 63 Md. 2o (1885); Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 12o Pa. 624, 15 Atl.
553 (1888).
rThis theory is that the individual by accepting the benefits of the charity
waives his right to sue the charity for damages occasioned by the negligence of
its servants in the administration of the charity. Powers v. Massachusetts Homoeo-
pathic Hospital, 1o9 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 190); Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day
Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 849 (1938); Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, io5 N.E. 92 (1914) (dictum).
'Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 1o5 N.E. 92 (1914);
Hillyer v. The Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, [19o9] 2 K.B. 820. See
Glavin v. The Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411, 424 (1879) (dictum).
7Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 At. 595 (1895); Bond v. Pitts-
burgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951); Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul,
131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921).
'Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital & Dispensary, 248 N.Y. 176, 3o N.E.2d
373 (1940); Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924). Cf.
Hamburger v. Cornell University, 24o N.Y. 328, 148 N.E. 539 (1925).
'This distinction allows recovery by a stranger while denying recovery to a
CASE COMMENTS
property injury.10 From the mass of decisions no single thread of con-
sistency can be drawn. "The cases are almost riotous with dissent.
Reasons are even more varied than results. These are earmarks of
law in flux. They indicate something wrong at the beginning or that
something has become wrong since then. They also show that correc-
tion, though in process, is incomplete.""
The efforts of the New York courts to find a satisfactory solution
to this problem present an interesting example of the evolution of
the tort immunity doctrine. The first important New York case was
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital.2 Prior to this decision,
New York had rejected the doctrine of complete immunity and the
trust fund theory.13 Hospitals had not been relieved of liability in
cases involving injuries to strangers.' 4 Judge Cardozo, speaking for
the Court of Appeals, said that charitable immunity in New York
was based on the waiver theory and the independent contractor
theory.'3 The support given the waiver theory, however, was only
dictum as it was inapplicable in this case which involved a trespass
for an unauthorized operation. Under the independent contractor
theory, doctors and nurses are considered independent contractors
and not servants of the hospitals. This theory is based on the hospital's
lack of control over doctors and nurses in the performance of their
professional tasks because of the very high degree of skill required.
An additional basis for this theory is the thought that hospitals do
not undertake to treat patients, but merely attempt to procure, for the
patients, persons who will treat them on their own responsibility.
However, it would seem that public policy was strongly involved in
the decision, for the court said: "A ruling would, indeed, be an un-
fortunate one that might constrain charitable institutions, as a
measure of self-protection, to limit their activities.... In this benef-
beneficiary. Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 203 N.Y. 191, 96 N.E. 406 (1911);
Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E. 626 (igio).1 This distinction is that immunity will be granted if the injuries sustained
are personal in nature, but the injured party will be allowed to enjoin a charity
from maintaining a nuisance and will be awarded damages for injury to his prop-
erty caused by the nuisance. Love v. Nashville Agricultural and Normal Institute,
146 Tenn. 550, 243 S.W. 304 (1922).
uPresident and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d Sio, 812
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
1 221 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
13Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation of Long Island, 203 N.Y. 191, 96
N.E. 4o6 (1911); Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E. 626 (gio).
"4Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation of Long Island, 2o3 N.Y. 191, 96 N.E.
406 (1911). Cf. Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E. 626 (igio).
"ZSchloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 1o5 N.E. 92 (1914).
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icent work it does not subject itself to liability for damages, though
the ministers of healing whom it has selected have proved unfaithful
to their trust."'
6
Under the Schloendorff rule hospitals were immune from liability
only where a beneficiary was injured through the negligence of a doc-
tor or nurse. It did not bar liability if an employee inflicted the injury
or if someone other than a beneficiary were injured. Since the Schloen-
dorff rule was announced, it has been weakened, modified, limited and
finally overruled.
Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital'7 weakened the rule. In this case
an intern, under an obligation to work for the hospital in return for
room and board, injured himself while performing an autopsy. He
sued the hospital for damages after he suffered blood poisoning caused
by his injury. The court held that he qualified as an "employee" un-
der the workmen's compensation act, and could therefore recover
damages from the hospital. Judge Cardozo distinguished the Schloen-
dorff case on the grounds that Bernstein dealt with the relationship
existing between the intern and the hospital, whereas the Schloendorff
case dealt with the relationship that existed between the patient and
the hospital. Following the reasoning of this case, if an intern, while
performing a medical act, had negligently injured both himself and
a patient, he apparently could have recovered for his injuries under
the workmen's compensation act, but the patient would have been
denied recovery under the Schloendorff rule. It seems illogical that
a person could have been considered both a servant and an indepen-
dent contractor at the same time in the performance of a single act.
Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hospital's modified the Schloendorff rule
by substituting the nature of the injury-producing act for the "payroll
designation" of the person causing the injury as the standard for
imposing liability. In this case, a patient was injured when an orderly
negligently applied a hot water bottle. The court held that liability
could not be imposed simply because the injury-producing act was
performed by an orderly rather than by a nurse. The court reasoned
that a more valid standard for liability would be the nature of the
injury-producing act. In this case, the act was held to be a medical
act pertaining to the treatment of the patient. Therefore, the hospital
was immune regardless of who performed the act. However, liability
would have been imposed even if the act had been performed by a
'Old. at 95.
"'236 N.Y. 268, 14o N.E. 694 (1923).
18239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924).
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doctor or a nurse if the court had found it to be an administrative act.
The medical-administrative distinction announced in the Phillips
case, and followed thereafter, was intended to clarify the law. Un-
fortunately, it only added confusion to the Schloendorff rule. Be-
cause of this distinction, a hospital could be liable for the administra-
tive acts of doctors and nurses and not be liable for the medical acts
of an employee. The so-called hot-water bottle cases illustrate this.
The placing of a hot-water bottle in a bed, prior to the patient's get-
ting in bed, was held to be an administrative act and the patient was
allowed to recover for burns inflicted.' 9 However, when a hot-water
bottle was placed in a bed while the patient was in the bed, immunity
was granted. Since professional judgment was involved in deciding
whether or not to remove the hot-water bottle, the court held that a
medical act was involved.2 0 Another example of the subtlety of this
distinction is shown by Berg v. New York Soc'y for Relief of Ruptured
and Crippled.2 1 The court, by way of dictum, said that a blood test
preparatory to a transfusion was a medical act. This case has been
interpreted as meaning that it would be a medical act to give a
patient the wrong type of blood in a blood transfusion. 22 However,
in a previous case, the court held that the giving of a blood transfus-
ion to the wrong patient was a non-medical act.
23
The line that can be drawn between a medical and an administra-
tive act is a tenuous one. The distinction is too elusive to provide a
satisfactory basis for judicial decision. Although the Berg case helped
clear up some of the confusion by holding that the medical-admin-
istrative distinction could not be applied in cases where the injury-
producing act was performed by an employee, the confusion still ex-
'-Iacono v. New York Polyclinic Medical School and Hospital, 269 App. Div.
955, 58 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1945).
'-Sutherland v. New York Polyclinic Medical School and Hospital, 298 N.Y. 682,
82. N.E.2d 583 (1948).
"i N.Y.2d 499, 136 N.E.2d 523 (1956).
2Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 4 (1957).
nNecolayff v. Genesee Hospital, 27 o App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d 832 (4th Dep't
1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947). For additional illustrations com-
pare Peck v. Charles B. Towns Hospital, 275 App. Div. 302, 89 N.Y.S.2d 19o (ist
Dep't 1949) (using improperly sterilized needle in a hypodermic injection is an
administrative act), with Bryant v. Presbyterian Hospital, 3o4 N.Y. 538, 11o N.E.2d
391 (1953) (improperly administering a hypodermic injection is a medical act). Also
compare Ranelli v. Society of New York Hospital, 295 N.Y. 85o , 67 N.E.2d 257
(1946) (failure to place sideboards on a bed when they are necessary is an ad-
ministrative act), with Grace v. Manhattan Eye, Ear, & Throat Hospital, 3o N.Y.
66o, 93 N.E.2d 926 (ig5o) (failure to decide if sideboards are necessary or not is a
medical act).
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isted in cases where the injury was produced by negligent doctors
or nurses.
Although the waiver theory had been criticized in prior decis-
ions, 24 it was not formally rejected until Sheehan v. North Country
Community Hospital25 denounced it as a fiction. Another reason for
rejecting this theory was to bring judicial doctrine into harmony with
the trend of abandoning governmental immunity in other types of
activity.
26
In the lower New York courts, two views developed as to the scope
of the Schloendorff rule. The narrow view was that the rule was ap-
plicable only to charitable hospitals, 27 while the broader view was
that both private and charitable hospitals were protected.28 The Court
of Appeals adopted the broader view in Bakal v. University Heights
Sanitarium, Inc. 29 With this decision, it would seem that charitable
immunity ceased to exist and that the immunity thereafter granted
to hospitals must have been based on other grounds. If the immunity
was based on the charitable nature of the hospital, how could a private
hospital be immune from liability for injuries suffered by paying
patients? With the extension of the immunity rule to protect private
hospitals the immunity was no longer a charitable one, although the
courts continued to speak of it as such.
Through the gradual erosion of the Schloendorff rule by court de-
cision, New York reached the point where the immunity rule pro-
tected a hospital in only one type of case. Only non-publicly owned
hospitals3O were protected and these only in cases where a patient was
injured by a doctor or nurse negligently performing a medical act.
New York took the final step and overruled the immunity rule in
Bing v. Thunig.3 ' In this case, the plaintiff was prepared by the hospi-
tal anesthetist and two nurses for an operation to correct a fissure of
nHamburger v. Cornell University, 240 N.Y. 328, 148 N.E. 539, 543 (1925);
Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199, 200 (1924).
2273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28 (1937).
2The court cited Court of Claims Act § 12-a.
"Post v. Crown Heights Hospital, 173 Misc. 250, 17 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct.
1940); Meshel v. Crotona Park Sanitarium, 154 Misc. 221, 276 N.Y. Supp. 989 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1935).
2'Steinert v. Brunswick Home Inc., 172 Misc. 787, 16 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct.
1939), aff'd mem., 259 App. Div. ioi8, 20 N.Y.S.2d 459 (2d Dep't 1940).
"302 N.Y. 87o, 1oo N.E.2d 51 (1951).
-Public hospitals are liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See
Becker v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.2d 266, 14o N.E.2d 262 (1957), wherein the
court refused to invoke the charitable immunity rule because of a statute which
waived the state's immunity from tort liability.
12 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
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the anus. In the preparation the nurses applied an inflammable al-
coholic antiseptic. The nurses knew of the potential danger of this
antiseptic and were cautioned to use care in its application. They were
instructed to remove all sheeting that became contaminated with
the solution. The doctor was not present during the application and
appeared about fifteen minutes later to perform the operation. He
used a heated electric cautery to mark the fissure prior to the actual
searing of the tissue. When this instrument was applied to the fissure
there was "a smell of very hot singed linen. ' 32 The area was doused
with water and the operation proceeded. Upon later examination it
was discovered that the plaintiff had suffered severe burns and that
the linen was burned in several places. The hospital tried to avoid
liability on the grounds of the medical-administrative distinction,
contending that the nurses' failure to remove the contaminated sheet-
ing was a medical act for which no liability could be imposed. The
court, however, reviewed the history of the immunity rule in New York,
took note of the modern trend in other jurisdictions and among legal
writers favoring the imposition of liability, and concluded that "hos-
pitals should, in short, shoulder the responsibilities borne by everyone
else. There is no reason to continue their exemption from the universal
rule of respondeat superior. The test should be ... was the person
who committed the negligent injury-producing act one of its em-
ployees and, if he was, was he acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. '3 3 The fiction that doctors and nurses are not employees, merely
because of their skill and because of the hospital's lack of control over
their professional acts, was rejected. The usual tests used in determin-
ing whether or not a person is an employee or an independent con-
tractor were adopted to determine if doctors or nurses are employees
of the hospital. In the Bing case, it was held that the nurses were
employees of the hospital and liability was imposed.
34
New York has, by overruling the immunity doctrine, kept pace
with the recent trend. Since Judge Rutledge's opinion in the George-
town College case,35 the immunity doctrine has rapidly fallen into dis-
repute. Eight state appellate courts and Puerto Rico have overruled
MId. at 4.
'id. at 8.
'Chief Judge Conway, in a separate opinion, concurred in the result. How-
ever, he would have imposed liability on the ground that the nurses' failure
to remove the contaminated sheeting was an administrative act. He would not
have overruled the Schloendorff rule as he felt that it had justified itself over the
years by protecting small hospitals. Id. at 9.
mPresident and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 13o F.2d So (D.C.
Cir. 1942).
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prior decisions and abandoned the immunity doctrine since 1942.3"
During the same time, five jurisdictions have rejected this doctrine as
a matter of first impression.37 No appellate court has adopted this
doctrine since before 1942.38 This trend away from immunity has been
almost universally supported by the text writers.39
Although different theories have been formulated by various courts
to support immunity from tort liability, public policy seems to be the
underlying reason for granting immunity. The rule is the modern
heritage of the Georgian and Victorian ideas of jurisprudence in
which property rights were paramount to the rights of the individual.
40
But since that time public policy has caused the law to shift the losses
due to injury from the innocent individual to the community at large.
The change in public policy is reflected in workmen's compensation
acts, social security acts, and welfare laws. The changes in public
policy are gradual and the mutations caused in the law are even
more gradual. There is no Polaroid camera in law which can catch and
picture in a minute the changes in public policy. These pictures are
visible on the legal film only after a long time-exposure during which
the film is exposed to the rays of public policy.41 During the past
few years, the changes in public policy have begun to show in the
development of the law.
Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); Malloy v.
Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n,
241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950); Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan.
751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954); Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55
So. 2d 142 (1951), 56 So. 2d. 709 (1952); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d
3 (1957); Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.-2d 410 (1956);
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 26o P.2d 765
(1953); Tavarez v. San Juan Lodge, 68 P.R. 681 (1948).
'President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 13o F.2d 8io (D.C.
Cir. 1942); Durney v. St. Francis Hospital Inc., 46 Del. (7 Terry) 350, 83 A.2d 753
(1951); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247
(1946); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230
(195o); Moats v. Sisters of Charity of Providence, 13 Alaska 546 (1952).
'Research failed to disclose any adoption of the immunity rule except by the
Washington court which apparently reversed its opinion as expressed in Pierce v.
Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, supra note 36, in Lyon v. Tumwater
Evangelical Free Church, 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P.2d 128 (1955), which limited the
doctrine of the Pierce case to its facts. It is still not definitely dear whether the
court will impose full liability as implied by the Pierce case or only limited
liability as implied by the Lyon case.
"OHarper, Torts § 294 (1933); Prosser, Torts 784-88 (2d ed. 1955); 4 Scott, Trusts
§ 402 (2d ed. 1956); Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions, 22
A.B.A.J. 48 (1936); Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev.
191, 192 (1928).
40Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 191 (1928).
"Id. at 195.
